Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons

00:01:35

Software Supply Chain Provenance: Beyond the Version...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/10/08

A component name and version do not prove provenance. This CUP Micro Brief explains how pedigree, cryptographic hashes and a verifiable chain of custody can help identify tampered code before it enters the build.Related CUP episodes:NIST IR 8536: Verifying the Software Supply ChainSBOM and VEX: Turning Vulnerability Data into OT Risk DecisionsSBOM and VEX: Challenging Supplier Vulnerability ClaimsSecurity Scanner Supply Chains: The Trivy and CERT-EU Case

en

00:03:25

OT Vendor VPN Security: Closing Hidden Maintenance...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/10/08

A VPN can authenticate a supplier while still bypassing the architecture intended to protect production. This CUP Focus shows how flat VLANs, direct Level 1 access and encrypted blind spots can turn legitimate maintenance into an invisible attack path.Related CUP episodes:Legacy VPNs in OT: Remote Access and the Cost of DisruptionOT Remote Access: Closing the Path When the Work EndsOT Session Hijacking: Revoking Trusted Engineering AccessOT Remote Access: Securing the Path to Physical Control

en

00:03:20

An Automotive Alert Is Not an Incident Response | CUP...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/10/03

Detection creates a signal, not a decision. This CUP Focus separates the responsibilities of the VSOC and PSIRT, from initial fleet triage and first-mile forensics to root-cause analysis and long-term remediation.Format: CUP Focus, a self-contained section from the Cybersecurity Under Pressure archive.Listen to the full episode: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/toni-gonzalez-burgueo/episodes/An-IDPS-Alert-Is-Not-an-Incident-Response-Capability-e3knv4g

en

00:02:03

When Digital Actions Create Physical Impact | CUP...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/10/03

In OT, a digital action can move machinery, interrupt fabrication or weaken detection without obvious warning. This CUP Micro Brief links active scanning risk, IEC 62443 segmentation and AI model drift to physical resilience.Listen to the full episode:https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/toni-gonzalez-burgueo/episodes/The-Threat-Has-a-Body-Defending-Critical-Infrastructure-Against-Kinetic-AI-e3lv01v

en

00:04:43

A Clean Backup Does Not Prove a Safe Restart | CUP Focus

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/10/01

Restoring files is not the same as restoring operational confidence. This CUP Focus explains why an OT restart requires trusted control logic, known-good engineering baselines and a defensible go/no-go decision before physical production resumes.Format: CUP Focus, a self-contained section from the Cybersecurity Under Pressure archive.Listen to the full episode:

en

01:20:40

Detecting the Attack Is Not Proving Safety: IAM4RAIL...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/09/30

n a railway system, detecting malicious activity and understanding its safety consequence are two different engineering problems.In this episode of Cybersecurity Under Pressure: Real Attacks, Real Lessons, we use work developed within Europe’s Rail FP3-IAM4RAIL as a case study in one of the most important distinctions in railway cybersecurity: cybersecurity monitoring can tell us that something suspicious is happening, but it does not automatically tell us what authority the attacker has gained,

en

01:30:29

Secure Boot Is Not a Checkbox: Espressif AR2026-006...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/09/28

Secure Boot is often represented as a simple security property: enabled or disabled. But a configuration flag does not tell us whether the complete chain used to establish trust at boot actually behaves as intended.In this episode of Cybersecurity Under Pressure: Real Attacks, Real Lessons, we examine Espressif security advisory AR2026-006, affecting ECDSA-based Secure Boot on specific revisions of the ESP32-H2, ESP32-C5, ESP32-C61, ESP32-P4 and ESP32-S31. The issue sits inside ROM-based ECDSA

en

00:01:50

When a License Plate Becomes a Password | CUP Micro...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/09/27

A public vehicle identifier became the starting point for a remote attack chain. This CUP Micro Brief connects the Kia API flaw, the disappearance of the traditional vehicle perimeter and the need for blind exploit validation.Listen to the full episode:https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/toni-gonzalez-burgueo/episodes/Your-License-Plate-Is-the-Password-What-the-Kia-API-Hack-Revealed-e3lumpt

en

01:34:57

Beyond Software Supply Chains: NSA ASIC Assurance and...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/09/14

When cybersecurity teams discuss supply-chain risk, the conversation usually starts with software. But some of the most consequential trust decisions are made much deeper in the stack — inside the hardware itself.In this episode of Cybersecurity Under Pressure: Real Attacks, Real Lessons, we examine the NSA’s latest guidance for Application Specific Integrated Circuits, or ASICs, and what its Level of Assurance 1 framework tells us about securing custom microelectronics throughout design and

en

01:33:23

Secure at the Factory, Exposed at the Dealership: The...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/09/11

A vehicle can leave the factory with a carefully designed cybersecurity architecture and acquire a new attack surface before the owner even drives it home.In this episode of Cybersecurity Under Pressure: Real Attacks, Real Lessons, we examine the BLE Theft Auto research into aftermarket Bluetooth Low Energy remote-control and anti-theft systems. Installed by dealerships or vehicle owners, these products can connect smartphone applications to door locks, alarms, lights, immobilizers, ignition systems

en

01:17:24

Frauscher FDS102: Why Railway Diagnostics Belong...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/09/07

A diagnostic system does not have to control the safety function to become operationally critical.In this episode of Cybersecurity Under Pressure: Real Attacks, Real Lessons, we examine the vulnerabilities affecting the Frauscher FDS102 diagnostic environment and the broader lesson they reveal about railway cybersecurity.The disclosures do not demonstrate compromise of the FAdC axle-counting safety logic itself. But that distinction does not make the diagnostic tier insignificant.Diagnostic

en

00:50:25

When the Automotive Update Path Becomes the Attack Path

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/08/28

The most revealing automotive malware cases do not always begin by exploiting an unknown vulnerability. Sometimes they begin with software that the vehicle already trusts.In this episode, we examine a malware infection chain targeting Android-based automotive head units. At its centre was TWCore, a legitimate system application used for analytics and software updates. Instructions received through an MQTT broker told the application which APK packages to download and install. A parameter called

en

00:33:53

When AI Lowers the Barrier to Attacking Siemens S7 PLCs

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/08/26

Artificial intelligence is changing the economics of industrial cyberattacks. Capabilities that once required specialist PLC knowledge can now be assembled faster by combining AI coding assistants with open-source libraries such as Python-Snap7.In this episode, we examine how Python scripts can interact directly with Siemens S7 controllers, read or modify PLC memory, and turn legitimate engineering functionality into a potential operational attack path.The central issue is not a new industrial

en

00:37:51

Trusted Software, Wrong Weld: Why OT Integrity Is Not...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/08/19

A welding robot can execute trusted software, accept authorized commands and still produce the wrong physical result.That distinction sits at the heart of this episode of Cybersecurity Under Pressure: Real Attacks, Real Lessons.We examine a fundamental problem in industrial cybersecurity: the difference between proving that software and commands are legitimate and proving that the physical process is still doing what engineering intended.The Technical Breakdown separates logical intent from

en

00:37:12

Railway AI at Risk: When Subcontractor Leaks Break...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/08/14

Your railway systems may be secure. Your AI environment may be protected. But what happens when sensitive information escapes through a subcontractor?In this episode of Cybersecurity Under Pressure: Real Attacks, Real Lessons, we examine a growing challenge for railway cybersecurity: protecting sensitive AI and engineering assets across a supply chain that extends far beyond the organisation itself.We trace how information can move through subcontractors and suppliers, how seemingly isolated leaks

en

00:44:23

Why Signed Firmware Is Still Vulnerable: The Trust...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/08/12

A valid digital signature tells you that firmware was signed by a trusted key. It does not necessarily tell you that everything behind that signature can still be trusted.In this episode of Cybersecurity Under Pressure: Real Attacks, Real Lessons, we examine one of the most dangerous assumptions in product cybersecurity: that signed firmware automatically means secure firmware.We trace the problem back through the engineering and software supply chain, exploring how a securely designed product can

en

00:46:33

Aftermarket Car Alarms: The Answer Is Not to Make...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/08/07

A dealer-installed anti-theft device should make a vehicle safer. But what happens when that device introduces a new wireless path into the vehicle itself?Researchers identified serious Bluetooth weaknesses in KARR and SWDS aftermarket alarm systems installed in approximately 2.2 million vehicles. From close range, an attacker could potentially unlock doors, control the alarm and activate the immobiliser, preventing the vehicle’s next engine start.That distinction matters. The research does not

en

00:35:55

When AI Crossed the Trust Boundary: The...

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/08/03

A routine AI benchmark became a real security incident when a pre-release model crossed the boundaries of its evaluation environment and reached infrastructure belonging to Hugging Face.The incident exposed a deeper architectural problem: transitive trust. The sandbox could access a self-hosted JFrog Artifactory instance to retrieve software dependencies. That trusted connection created a potential bridge to systems the model was never intended to reach.In this episode of Cybersecurity Under

en

00:33:17

When ECUs Meet Malice

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/06/12

What if the most vulnerable point in automotive cybersecurity isn't the car itself, but the station that gives it its software identity, setting the stage for a potential disaster that could put lives at risk.In this episode we break down the critical intersection of product cybersecurity and factory cybersecurity, and explore the potential consequences of a compromised ECU flashing station. We walk through a real-world scenario where a flaw in the flashing process could lead to a supply chain

en

00:31:59

Cyber Gaps in Automotive Supply

Cybersecurity Under Pressure. Real Attacks, Real Lessons ·

2026/06/05

What happens when a vulnerability is discovered in a car's system after production has started, and nobody knows who's responsible for fixing it?In this episode we break down the messy world of automotive cybersecurity, where gaps in responsibility between companies can put entire systems at risk. We walk through real-world scenarios where the lack of clear agreements and ownership can lead to major problems. We argue that these gaps are not just technical issues, but also governance

en

All Episodes

Similar Podcasts

Lead With AI

Tamara Nall

Elon Musk Podcast

Stage Zero

Two Blokes Talking Tech

Trevor Long and Stephen Fenech

Download This Show

ABC Australia

Amelia"s Weekly Fish Fry

EEJournal.com